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Losses and Gains to Developing Countries from the 
Migration of Educated Workers: An Overview of 
Recent Research, and New Reflections 
 
Oded Stark * and C. Simon Fan+ 
 
Abstract 
 
 This paper synthesizes and extends recent research on “The New 
Economics of the Brain Drain.” In a unified framework, the paper 
shows that while recently identified adverse repercussions of the brain 
drain exacerbate the long-recognized negative impact of the brain 
drain, longer-term consequences turn the brain drain into the 
harbinger of powerful gains. These gains have been studied already in 
recent research, or merit attention in future research.   
 
Labor migration has long been a topic of intense interest in 
population research in general and in development economics in 
particular. The topic has been gaining added appeal in the era of 
globalization. Until recently, the received literature has taken a simple 
view on the consequences of the migration of educated people from 
developing countries: it results in a “brain drain” (for a systematic 
review see Bhagwati and Wilson 1989). A recent and growing literature, 
notably Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 1998), Mountford 
(1997), and Stark and Wang (2002), argues that the brain drain is 
accompanied by a beneficial brain gain. The new writings contend that 
compared to a closed economy, an economy open to migration differs 
not only in the opportunities workers face but also in the structure of 
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the incentives that they confront: higher prospective returns to human 
capital in a foreign country impinge favorably on human capital 
formation decisions at home. 
 
In a set of recent papers (Fan and Stark 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) we 
synthesize and extend the two strands of the received literature, and we 
analyze both the positive and negative impact of the migration of 
educated workers in a unified framework. In this article we summarize 
our recent research, and elaborate the further implications of our work. 
 
1. In the short run, the negative consequences of the migration of 
educated workers amount to more than a “brain drain” 
 
We extend the received literature of “harmful brain drain” by 
showing that in the short run, international migration can result in 
“educated unemployment” and in overeducation, as well as in a brain 
drain. Specifically, and in contrast with the literature that views the 
brain drain as the only negative consequence of international migration 
of educated or skilled workers, we identify three possible negative 
short-run consequences. 
 
First, consistent with the “traditional” view, migration leads to a 
reduction in the “stock” of better-educated individuals, which in turn 
reduces the average income in the developing country.  
 
Second, since some educated individuals who would otherwise 
have taken jobs are lured into further education only to end up 
unemployed, output shrinks. Indeed, in a number of developing 
countries, a large fraction of the educated workforce is unemployed. 
For example, in their influential development economics textbook, 
Gillis et al. (1996) allude to the Sri Lankan experience as a striking 
example, noting that half of the country’s new university graduates 
 3
were unemployed in the 1970s. Also, Mathew (1997) reports that in 
urban Kerala, India in 1983, the unemployment rate of university 
graduates was 11.34 percent for males and 25.69 percent for females, 
which is much higher than the unemployment rate of those who had no 
education (3.52 percent for males, and 1.52 percent for females), and 
the unemployment rate of those who had only primary education (6.73 
percent for males, and 8.43 percent for females). More recently, 
Boudarbat (2004) shows that in 2000, the unemployment rate of 
university graduates in Morocco was about four times that of 
individuals with less than six years of schooling.1 The phenomenon of 
educated unemployment in those developing countries contrasts sharply 
with the pattern of unemployment in developed countries. In the latter, 
the unemployment rate and educational attainment are strongly 
negatively correlated (Ashenfelter and Ham, 1979). In Fan and Stark 
(2007a), we present a model of “educated unemployment.” We contend 
that “educated unemployment” is caused by the prospect of 
international migration, that is, by the possibility of a “brain drain.” In a 
simple job-search framework we show that an individual’s reservation 
wage in the labor market of the home country increases with the 
probability of working abroad. Consequently, workers who fail to line 
up employment abroad are less likely to immerse themselves 
immediately in work in their home country. Instead, they enter 
unemployment in order to engage in a repeated attempt to secure 
foreign employment. Thus, we provide a new explanation for the 
phenomenon of “educated unemployment” observed in developing 
countries. In Fan and Stark (2007c) we add to Fan and Stark (2007a) by 
re-examining the link between the prospect of migration and 
unemployment in a fixed-wage framework, suggesting that the prospect 
                                                 
1  There is a fairly large empirical literature that consistently documents such a 
phenomenon of educated unemployment in a number of developing countries. For 
additional evidence that in developing countries the incidence of unemployment is higher 
amongst the educated see Tenjo (1990) for Colombia, Dickens and Lang (1995) for Sri 
Lanka, and Serneels (2007) for Ethiopia. 
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of migration results in involuntary unemployment in the domestic labor 
market. We argue that a sticky-wage model portrays accurately a setting 
in which, consistent with considerable empirical and policy-related 
research, a great many university graduates compete for relatively few 
jobs in the public sector where the wage rate is fixed.  We develop a 
simple model showing that in a developing country, an increase in the 
probability of working abroad induces more individuals to acquire 
education, which leads to an increase in the labor supply of educated 
workers in the domestic labor market. Due to a sticky wage rate, the 
demand for labor is constant. We show that the increase in the 
probability of working abroad results then in an increase in the 
unemployment rate of educated workers in the domestic labor market.  
 
Third, since the possibility of migration induces individuals in a 
developing country to acquire higher education, when some of these 
individuals end up remaining in the country, the returns to their 
education could be less than its costs. From their perspective, they are 
overeducated. If the country’s economy cannot “take off,” then these 
individuals’ overeducation is socially inefficient (in the short run). 
There is an interesting literature on “overeducation” which, in labor 
economics, is defined somewhat differently than in our setting. Using 
American data, Sicherman (1991) shows that overeducation can be 
partly explained by the mobility patterns of educated workers. In our 
setting, overeducation is explained by the migration prospect of 
educated workers.   
 
In Fan and Stark (2007b) we conduct a simulation exercise 
showing that the costs of the two new negative consequences of 
migration introduced in our research work, namely “educated 
unemployment” and overeducation, can amount to significant losses for 
the individuals affected, who may constitute a substantial proportion of 
the educated individuals. However, in per capita terms, the cost of the 
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brain drain can be relatively small if the proportion of educated 
individuals in the economy is small. The simulation further shows that 
as the wage gap between the foreign country and the home country 
widens, the average cost of educated unemployment, and that of 
overeducation, will increase too. 
 
2. A brief brush with evidence: educated unemployment and 
overeducation in developing countries 
 
The perception that educated workers are sunk into voluntary 
unemployment at home, awaiting a job offer that is in line with their 
expectations, has received considerable attention in the development 
literature.2 
 
In policy-related research, it is argued that the strong demand for 
a higher level education and the consequent phenomenon of educated 
unemployment are caused by international migration, which 
significantly increases the expected returns to education relative to the 
returns in a closed economy. For example, King (1987) who studies the 
brain drain and educated unemployment in the Philippines observes (p. 
101): “In the case of the Philippines, however, a very high demand for 
college education has accompanied high rates of unemployment and 
underemployment and generally low real wages. Data on immigration ... 
reflect how the demand for education has been heavily influenced and 
encouraged by expected rates of return from employment in overseas 
labour markets. The horizons of Filipinos have expanded beyond the 
domestic market because of the tremendous number of professionals 
who found employment, career advancement and financial rewards 
overseas. In a situation where unemployment exists and international 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Blaug (1970), and ILO (1971); Tenjo (1990), Zoctizoum (1980), and 
Muta (1990) alluded to below; and Mathew (1997), and Boudarbat (2004) already 
referred to above. 
 6
migration is seen as a form of relief, the decline in unemployment is 
only temporary, as the supply of professionals is increased by higher 
expected wages. In the long run, unemployment may even be 
aggravated. Government subsidy of the cost of education of emigrants, 
of inexperienced workers who replace them, and of a greater number of 
students wanting to enter the same profession will have to be absorbed 
by the economy. Even where the cost of education is fully paid by the 
individual, the demand for education increases in an occupation where 
there are already unemployed resources.” 
 
Tullao (1982) who studies the problem of unemployed nurses in 
the Philippines states (p. 45): “The demand for nursing education in the 
Philippines is influenced significantly by international migration. The 
private profitability of investing in nursing education is greatly 
increased when the probability of emigration is included in the 
investment calculus. Filipinos would not demand nursing education in 
the light of low wages and limited employment opportunities in the 
domestic market as reflected in the low rate of return to nursing 
education without migration. These unattractive domestic employment 
prospects, and the cost of education are, however, overpowered by the 
profitability of migration and the wage differential between foreign and 
domestic market, which make the expected rates of return to nursing 
education significantly higher than the returns without migration.”  
 
Muta (1990) who seeks to understand the root causes of educated 
unemployment in Asia, states (p. 23): “Migration of the educated 
suggests that the demand for education has been heavily influenced and 
encouraged by the expected return from employment in overseas labour 
markets.” 
 
Zoctizoum (1980) studies the problem of unemployment among 
educated young people in the French-Speaking developing countries of 
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Africa, which include the Central African Republic, Cameroon, the 
Ivory Coast, Benin, Gabon and Mali. Zoctizoum observes that the 
phenomenon of brain drain occurs in parallel with the phenomenon of 
educated unemployment. Zoctizoum writes (p. 106): “Most States are 
affected by an acute shortage of university graduates and skilled 
manpower, especially in technical occupations. Paradoxically, the 
‘brain drain’ is increasing. African technicians, engineers and doctors 
are therefore numerous in Europe. A survey carried out in France in 
1968 revealed that 6.4 per cent of the total number of workers from 
Africa and Madagascar living in France consisted of persons belonging 
to the `higher management’ category. This proportion was nearly 60 per 
cent higher than that of French `higher management’ in relation to the 
active French population.” 
 
Finally, an interesting observation is that educated unemployment 
appears to have pervaded developing countries in which the official 
language is English (such as the Philippines, India, and Bangladesh in 
Asia (Muta)), or French (the former French colonies in Africa 
(Zoctizoum)). Education acquired in these countries is relatively readily 
transferable to the developed world, that is, skilled migration is viable. 
Consequently, these countries have simultaneously experienced a large-
scale brain drain and educated unemployment. 
 
3. Why is it that in the long run the migration of educated workers 
is a blessing in disguise to developing countries? 
 
As noted in Stark (2004, 2005), a recent growing literature on the 
“brain gain” has shown that when migration is probable, the brain drain 
script may have to be rewritten. For example, Stark and Wang (2002) 
identified conditions under which enhanced skills result in a higher per-
capita output in the home country than would have been achieved if 
migration were not possible. This outcome arises (partly) because 
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workers who do not end up as migrants work at home. But as they are 
equipped with the skills acquired in response to their probable 
migration, they are more productive. 
 
In Fan and Stark (2007b) we add to this emerging literature by 
examining a framework of a “threshold externality” of human capital, 
which enables us to analyze the negative and positive impacts of 
migration in different periods, and to make welfare comparisons. We 
demonstrate that in the long run (“one generation down the road”), the 
legacy of a relaxation in migration policy prompts “take-off” of the 
economy. Drawing on studies by Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and 
Galor and Stark (1994) that link the long-run growth in a country’s 
output with the average level of the country’s human capital, we 
emphasize the role of a “threshold externality” of human capital in 
economic development. (Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Pritchett 
(1997) provide evidence in support of the assumption of a threshold 
externality. Fan (2004) offers an explanation for the existence of the 
threshold externality in economic development by showing that a poor 
economy will engage in international trade, which will accelerate its 
growth, if and only if its average level of human capital is sufficiently 
high.) In a dynamic framework we show that the brain drain is 
accompanied by a “brain gain;” that the ensuing “brain gain” can result 
in a higher average level of human capital in the home country; that the 
higher average level of human capital can prompt “take-off” of the 
economy; and that the “take-off” can bite into the unemployment rate. 
Thus, we depict a setting in which rather than being to blame for human 
capital drain and output contraction, the migration of educated workers 
is the harbinger of human capital gain and output growth. An analysis 
of the entire dynamics associated with the response of educated 
workers to the prospect of migration therefore raises the intriguing 
possibility that what at first sight appears to constitute a curse is, in fact, 
a blessing in disguise. Our results are more dramatic than those 
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reported in the received literature because in our present framework the 
prospect of migration is taken to entail both depletion of human capital 
and unemployment of human capital, which stacks the cards more 
firmly against viewing migration as a catalyst for growth. 
 
Our analytical predictions appear to be in line with empirical 
observations. For example, from 1960 to 1980 countries characterized 
by high rates of migration of skilled labor (such as India and Ireland) 
were among those countries that experienced the lowest rates of 
economic growth (Summers and Heston, 1991). However, since the late 
1980s (that is, after approximately one generation), both India and 
Ireland have experienced rapid economic growth, which to a large 
extent has been due to an expansion of their skill-intensive information 
technology sector.3  
 
Specifically, our recent and ongoing research suggests that the 
“brain gain” can be manifested via at least three channels. 
 
First, overeducation can become dynamically efficient (due to the 
intergenerational externality effect of human capital) even though it 
may be statically inefficient. This is because children will tend to be 
better educated if they have educated parents. The importance of 
parental education to a child’s educational attainment has been 
consistently documented since the well- known Coleman report 
(Coleman et al., 1966).4 There are numerous ways in which parents’ 
education may affect children’s educational attainment. For example, 
several educators (Sahota (1978, p.20), Van der Eyken (1977, p.70)) 
estimate that “about 50 percent of cognitive development of children 
occurs by the age of three or four.” Bloom (1981) estimates that 80 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Kapur and McHale (2003) on the link between migration and the 
growth of the IT sector in these countries. 
4 For a helpful survey see Hanushek (1996). 
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percent of an individual’s potential intelligence is developed by age 8. 
Clearly, as suggested by Osberg (1984), almost all this early 
conditioning environment is created by a child’s parents, and it is in 
these early years that the basic personality traits of a child such as self-
confidence and aspiration, which significantly affect the child’s future 
academic performance, are largely shaped. Some evidence (for example, 
Vernon, 1979) suggests that the home environment also affects 
children’s learning efficiency at school. In fact, the empirical literature 
seems to suggest that the effect of parental education is much greater 
than that of parental expenditure on children’s education. For example, 
based on his exhaustive survey of the existing literature, Hanushek 
(1996, p.16) concludes that “schools (i.e., expenditure on children’s 
schooling) seemed relatively unimportant in determining student 
achievement, while families were the key element of student success.” 
Thus, parental education has a strong intergenerational (externality) 
effect. This implies that while overeducation is costly to the individuals 
affected in the current generation, it is a social benefit rather than a 
social waste from a long term perspective. 
 
Second, even increased “uneducated unemployment” may benefit 
the long-run development of a developing country. Acemoglu and 
Shimer (1999) show that individuals often do not spend enough time in 
job search. They argue that moderate unemployment insurance not only 
imposes risk sharing, but also increases output. By similar logic, the 
possibility of working abroad makes educated individuals more “picky” 
about domestic jobs. Since the educated individuals who end up at 
home effectively spend more time searching for jobs in the domestic 
labor market, there will be a better match between skills and jobs, 
which implies that the jobs that are not suitable will be less likely to 
survive. From a long-term perspective, this further improves the 
industrial structures of the economy. 
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Third, the prevalence of employment opportunities abroad, where 
the skill mix and production technologies are vastly different from 
those at origin, could tilt the type of education sought in new directions; 
programming instead of engineering, biochemistry instead of law. The 
possibility that workers will acquire proficiencies in fields for which 
there is little current demand at home is often brought up as a criticism 
of the recent work on the beneficial brain drain: workers acquire skills 
that, while relevant abroad, may be of limited applicability at home. 
But it is possible, indeed intriguing, to consider turning this argument 
on its head. In general, the technologies in the “developed abroad” are 
inherently more advanced than those in developing countries. When N  
individuals acquire skills that are usable abroad, and when the 
probability of migration is 0 1p< < , the newly acquired knowledge of 
the ( )1 p N−  individuals who end up staying at home could be the 
catalyst for technological change at home; such a change is initiated, or 
brought forward, by the presence of know-how that without the 
prospect of migration would have been lacking. This argument may not 
be exactly Say’s Law, which James Mill restated as “supply creates its 
own demand,” but it is in the spirit of that perception. 
 
To a large extent, the exceptional recent rate of growth of the 
Indian economy (7.5 % last year) was made possible, fed, and oiled, by 
the immense strides in India’s Information Technology (IT) sector, and 
these strides, in turn, partly came about as a response to the lure of 
rewarding IT job opportunities abroad. This aspect of the brain drain 
could thus have been co-responsible for changing the course of Indian 
development, for tilting the economy away from agriculture and 
industry towards finance, information technology, and services. The 
brain drain could thus be seen as a catalyst not only for an expansion of 
the Indian economy (as in Fan and Stark, 2007b) but also its redirection 
- its skipping of several rungs in the ladder of technological progress. 
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As is well recognized, the phenomenal recent economic growth 
in India differs fundamentally from the phenomenal recent, and no so 
recent, growth in China (9.8% last year) in that China’s growth has 
been a product of its efficient, all-powerful government, whereas 
India’s growth has been largely unplanned. It is not a top-down affair; it 
is a bottom-up spectacle. In the balance sheet of state directives / 
individual initiatives, the inclinations of individuals, and the greater 
scope for translating these into action, played a larger role in India’s 
growth than in China’s. 
 
India has managed to produce world-class private sector 
companies: Infosys, Ranbaxy, Reliance. Infosys is a consultancy and IT 
services company with 60,000 employees; Ranbaxy is a pharmaceutical 
company with 10,000 employees; and Reliance is an information and 
communication company with 40,000 employees. None of these 
marvels, which so successfully produce for world markets, would have 
attained this status but for the Indian-based supply of IT personnel. And 
that supply would not exist without the prospect of employment 
overseas. This possibility caused people to acquire skills for which the 
local demand was then slim. Yet their initiative was not muted by 
knowing that with probability ( )1 p−  rewarding employment overseas 
will not be obtained. When the wage premium of overseas employment 
was sufficiently high, ( )1 p−  was not a deterrent. At the time, human 
capital investments oriented towards overseas employment could have 
been considered a poor fit to the Indian needs; they were good for 
“foreign” work - work in other industries in other countries. From the 
point of view of the Indian economy of the time, they were a waste of 
human capital. But the people who got the “wrong” training were the 
precursors of the development of technologies, sectors, industries, and 
companies that in themselves were, in many ways, of the “foreign 
type.” They swiftly manned the ranks of the said world-oriented 
companies which not only could not grow while facing bottlenecks of 
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skilled workers, but may very well have been conceived specifically to 
tap into the “miseducated” unutilized, or underutilized, pool. It is not 
(or not merely) that Indians who went abroad and returned home with 
enhanced skills were able to start producing in India as they did abroad; 
but that Indians waiting to work in fields that existed abroad but barely 
at all at home acquired locally the skills that brought “abroad” home. In 
a way, the failure of individuals to export themselves was conducive to 
the “import” of enterprises that could gleefully make use of the freshly-
formed talent. 
 
In summary, entrepreneurs assured of an adequate supply of 
workers trained to use advanced technologies could well be enticed to 
introduce these technologies at home once it was clear that the local 
workforce had become highly skilled. It is as if the brain drain, via the 
dynamic search for a higher level of education and skills it sets in 
motion, serves to loosen the grip of the traditional or obsolete 
technologies. It could even be anticipated that once the new 
technologies take hold, the returns to human capital within the country 
will be so raised that the initial “shock” of the brain drain will be 
replaced by a modified and home-based structure of incentives. In 
general, technological advance in developing countries can proceed in 
two ways: through gradual sequences in existing technologies, or by a 
leapfrog - where new technologies are adopted while skipping over 
revisions of existing technologies. Latterly, India has taken a huge leap 
into a high-tech service economy. Indirectly then, the brain drain could 
navigate a developing economy away from the former technological 
path onto the latter technological path. And lastly (and this could well 
constitute a fourth manifestation of the brain gain), when the returns to 
human capital at home are rising fast, especially in the wake of the new 
technologies “settling in,” it will not be all that surprising if a “reverse 
brain drain” is set in motion: skilled workers will return home to 
employ there the skills they have hitherto put to use abroad. 
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